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Sports Video Games and Student Athletes:  
An Analysis of Publicity Rights and First Amendment Concerns 
Kirsten O’Donnell 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past several years, multiple suits have been brought against Electronic Arts, Inc. 
(EA) by current and former National Collegiate Athletic Association (the NCAA) student 
athletes (student athletes).  The student athletes allege, among other claims, that EA publishes 
video games which feature the images of student athletes, in violation of their publicity rights.
1
  
In response, EA has claimed its video games are protected under the First Amendment, and that 
their First Amendment interests trump the publicity rights of the student athletes.
2
  
The use of student-athlete images in EA video games has been examined extensively in 
the academic world.  Many of these publications are primarily focused on discussing the inherent 
unfairness of the NCAA bylaws, specifically the amateurism clauses.
3
  These clauses prevent 
student athletes from receiving any compensation in connection with their athletic performance, 
but do not prevent the NCAA from receiving hundreds of millions of dollars per year through 
media and licensing agreements.
4
  In addition, third parties, such as EA, receive a huge economic 
benefit from licensing intellectual property from the NCAA for use in its products.
5
 
These publications raise possible solutions to address this inequity, such as repealing 
amateurism clauses in the NCAA bylaws;
6
 compensating student athletes through university-
provided salaries or trusts,
7
  allowing student athletes to contract with and be paid by third 
parties or requiring student athletes to license their image to the NCAA, which, although an 
expansion of the NCAA’s rights, would result in the NCAA lawfully acquiring the rights to 
student athletes’ images.8 
2 
 
This paper will argue, as many of the articles mentioned above, that student athletes have 
publicity rights and that EA, specifically through its NCAA Football games (NCAA Football), 
violates those rights.  In contrast to the above publications, however, this article will not propose 
solutions to address the inequity between student athletes and the NCAA.  Rather, this paper will 
argue that EA’s First Amendment rights should not outweigh the publicity rights of student 
athletes, and discuss how courts should analyze First Amendment defenses raised in right of 
publicity cases, specifically highlighting the First Amendment raised in right of publicity cases 
through an analysis of the First Amendment defense argued in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
To begin, this paper will provide a background of the NCAA’s history, bylaws and 
licensing.  Next, the paper will examine the right of publicity, demonstrating how student 
athletes possess publicity rights and how EA violated those rights. The paper will then analyze 
the First Amendment defense raised by EA in Hart and discuss how the Hart court misapplied 
the transformative use test in upholding EA’s defense.  Finally, this paper will address the 
potential subsequent impact of this decision, and discuss how courts should analyze First 
Amendment defenses in right of publicity cases. 
II. The NCAA, The Players and The Game 
A. The NCAA and Student Athletes 
Following a rash of serious injuries and some deaths in the 1905 football season,
9
 then-
President Theodore Roosevelt lead the charge to reform football.
10
  This push to reform resulted 
in 62 colleges and universities banding together in 1906 to form the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association of the United States (IAAUS).
11
  In 1910, the IIAUS was renamed the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association.
12
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The NCAA originally operated solely as a discussion group and rules-making body, until 
the first NCAA National Championship in 1921.
13
  More national championships followed the 
initial National Collegiate Track and Field Championship, and the group eventually grew to 
resemble the complex structure of the present-day NCAA.
14
 
Today, the NCAA’s stated purpose is to protect student-athletes with increased emphasis 
on athletics and academic excellence.
15
  To support these goals, the NCAA adopted an 
amateurism provision in its bylaws, purportedly to ensure athletes are: 1.) “motivated by 
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits” of participating in the sport, and 2.) 
“protected from exploitation by professional commercial enterprises.”16 
The NCAA bylaws prohibit student athletes from being compensated.
17
  Specifically, 
section 12.1.2 of the NCAA bylaws prohibits a student athlete from any of the following: using 
their athletic skill for pay, accepting a promise of pay, signing a contract to commit to a 
professional athletic team, or receiving salary or other financial assistance based on athletic skill 
or participation.
18
  If a student athlete violates any provision of section 12.1.2 of the NCAA 
bylaws, he or she loses amateur status, and becomes ineligible for competing in the sport related 
to the violation.
19
  Because of the amateurism clause in the NCAA bylaws, student athletes are 
prohibited from receiving any money for playing a sport professionally, endorsing any products 
or services, signing memorabilia in the off-season, or licensing their names, images or 
likenesses.
 20
  
The NCAA bylaws also require student athletes to sign certain forms in order to be 
eligible to participate in a collegiate athletic program.
21
 One of those forms, Form 11-3a, 
required by NCAA bylaw 12.5,
22
 “authorize[s] the NCAA (or a third party acting on behalf of 
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the NCAA . . .) to use [the student athlete’s] name or picture . . . to generally promote NCAA 
championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”23   
B. NCAA Licensing  
Under the NCAA bylaws, student athletes are not allowed to receive compensation for 
their athletic abilities; however, the NCAA does receive compensation, mainly through 
licensing.
24
  The NCAA has a long-term agreement with IMG College to administer the domestic 
and international licensing programs for the NCAA.
25
  The Collegiate Licensing Company 
(CLC), a subsidiary of IMG College, manages the daily administration of the NCAA licensing 
program.
26
 
The NCAA licensing agreements are extremely lucrative.  For example, media 
agreements are a significant source of revenue for the NCAA, constituting 86 percent of the 
NCAA’s revenue in 2009-2010.27  In 2010, the NCAA entered into a 14-year agreement with 
CBS and Turner Broadcasting System for $10.8 billion, or about $771 million annually.
28
 
In 2005, EA entered into an exclusive 6-year license with CLC for the NCAA’s 
intellectual property.
29
   This license made EA the top non-apparel licensee of the NCAA,
30
 and 
provided EA the exclusive right to use league logos, teams, stadiums and uniforms for use in its 
EA Games.
31
  The license does not provide EA any right to use the names, images or likenesses 
of NCAA student-athletes; however, it is widely recognized that the virtual players in EA games 
are clearly intended to represent NCAA student athletes.
32
   
III. Right of Publicity  
A. History and Development 
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The right of publicity has its roots in the right to privacy,
33
 and its evolution can be traced 
through several publications and key judicial decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.   
In Thomas Cooley’s 1888 publication A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs 
Which Arise Independent of Contract (Cooley on Torts), Cooley inferred the right to be let alone 
from a series of court decisions regarding contracts, personal property and defamation.
34
  
Public perceptions that the press had overstepped the bounds of decency and the advent 
of new technology motivated Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis to write about the right 
to privacy.
35
  In their 1890 publication The Right of Privacy, Warren and Brandeis supported 
Cooley’s right to be let alone, and classified this right as a subset of the right to life.36   
In 1953, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit coined the term “right 
of publicity”37 in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.38  
In Haelan, major league baseball players assigned exclusive rights to their photographs to 
the plaintiff for use in promoting the plaintiff’s product. 39  The complaint asserted that the 
defendant induced the players to assign the same rights while the players were still under 
contract with the plaintiff.
40
  The Haelan court rejected the defendant’s claims that: 1.) the 
contract was a release of the players’ right of privacy and 2.) such right was not an assignable 
property right, stating:  
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy, . . . a man has a right in 
the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege 
of publishing his picture. . . This might be called a “right of publicity.”  For it is 
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for 
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in 
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.  This right of publicity would 
usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive 
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
41
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This decision clarified and distinguished publicity from the right of privacy, and 
articulated the right as a property right, one that could be assigned, and used to recover 
damages from a defendant who used a plaintiff’s name or likeness without 
authorization.
42
 
Shortly after Haelan, Professor Melville Nimmer’s 1954 article The Right of Publicity 
sought to clarify and define the parameters of the right.
43
 In agreement with the holding in 
Haelan, Nimmer stated that celebrity status did not constitute a waiver of publicity rights and 
that such rights could be licensed or assigned.
44
  Nimmer also stated that everyone, not just 
celebrities, has a right of publicity,
45
 and provided policy rationales to support that assertion.
46
  
In particular, he argued that “the right of publicity . . . is the right of each person to control and 
profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased . . .,” and that “every person is 
entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing public policy 
considerations . . .”47  
In 1967, William Prosser furthered the discussion on the right of Publicity in his 
publication Privacy.   In this article, Prosser explained that the right of privacy as described in 
The Right of Privacy should be viewed as being comprised of four distinct torts: 
(i) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs,  
(ii) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff,  
(iii)Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and  
(iv) Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.48 
The first three torts proffered by Prosser clearly protect privacy interests of individuals.  This 
approach reflects the privacy concerns summarized in the The Right of Privacy.
49
  However, the 
final tort, appropriation, provided individuals a right Nimmer described as the other side of the 
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privacy coin.
50
  Instead of protecting one’s right to privacy in personal affairs, appropriation 
protected one’s ability to publicly exploit his or her name or likeness for commercial gain, and 
prevented others from doing so without permission.
51
  Prosser cited Haelan in support of 
creating the tort of appropriation, and, echoing Nimmer, recognized it as a proprietary right that 
could be transferred by selling licenses.
52
 
In 1977, the right of publicity was formally recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting, the only right to publicity 
case it has decided to date.
53
  Zacchini, a “human cannonball,” sued a news program for 
televising his entire fifteen-second performance without his permission.
54
  In holding in 
favor of Zacchini, the Court noted that the right of publicity not only ensures that 
entertainers are compensated for their work, but also provides entertainers with an 
“economic incentive . . . to make the investment required to produce a performance of 
interest to the public.” 55   This statement echoes the policy justifications for federal 
copyright and patent laws.
56
 
B. Modern Right of Publicity 
Today, the right of publicity is a matter of state law,
57
 and is recognized by statute, 
common law or a combination of both.
58 
 Though the elements vary from state to state, the right 
of publicity generally protects an individual’s property interest in his or her image.59  While there 
is no federal right of publicity,
60
 federal law, specifically the Lanham Act, provides similar 
protection by preventing unfair competition and misappropriation.
 61
  The Lanham Act provides 
protection against any false or misleading descriptions or representations of fact likely to cause 
confusion regarding a plaintiff’s endorsement of, or an affiliation, connection or association with 
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the defendant’s product or service.62  As a result of providing for similar protection, suits which 
raise right of publicity claims usually also raise claims under the Lanham Act.
63
   
C. Violation of Right of Publicity 
As noted above, the specific elements of the right of publicity vary by state.  In states that 
recognize publicity rights, however, courts generally consider the following elements to 
determine if a person’s right of publicity has been violated: 
(i) Use of the plaintiff’s identity 
 
(ii) For the commercial advantage of the defendant 
 
(iii)Without consent of the plaintiff 
 
(iv) Resulting in injury to the plaintiff.64 
1. Use of Plaintiff’s Identity 
Courts rely on statutory definitions, case law, or both to determine “identity” in right of 
publicity claims.   
As statutes and controlling law vary from state to state, definitions of the basic elements 
of a right to publicity claim also vary.
65
  For example, in California, one of the first states to 
enact a right of publicity statute and a state in which many right of publicity cases have been 
tried, “identity” includes the name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness of an individual,66  
and the definition applies equally to deceased personalities.
67
  In contrast, the Indiana right of 
publicity statute is much more expansive.
68
  Indiana defines identity, known as personality in the 
statute, as the “name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, 
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gestures or mannerisms” 69 of a living or deceased natural person, and provides that such right is 
descendible.
70
  Indiana’s expansive rights are in sharp contrast with the statutory right of 
publicity in New York, which narrowly defines “identity” as a living person’s name, portrait, 
picture or voice.
71
 
Courts have also relied on case law to shape the definition of “identity” under the right of 
publicity.  Courts have recognized “identity” to include a person’s name or likeness,72 distinctive 
voice,
73
 and any drawing or other artistic rendering intended to represent a particular person, 
whether or not the person’s name is actually used in connection with the depiction.74  Particularly 
applicable to the suits brought against EA, courts have also determined that “identity” includes 
electronic imitations of a person,
75
 animatronic reproductions of a person
76
  and virtual images of 
persons in video games.
77
  No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc
78
. is an example of the latter.  
In No Doubt, the Court of Appeals of California recognized avatars of No Doubt band members 
in the Activision game Band Hero as likenesses of the band members which could be licensed 
for a commercial purpose.
79
  Similarly, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the Court of Appeals of 
California determined that Kirby’s allegation that Sega used her identity to create a virtual 
character in a Sega videogame presented a triable issue of fact.
80
  
2. Use of Identity for a Commercial Advantage 
Using the name or likeness of another for commercial gain constitutes use of identity for 
a commercial advantage.
81
  Traditional misappropriation is usually obvious,
82
 and generally 
refers to an individual’s name or likeness in advertising or marketing to state or imply 
endorsement by the individual.
83
  Demonstrating use of identity for a commercial advantage is 
not limited to a showing of false endorsement, however.
84
  In C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
85
 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
10 
 
Eighth Circuit held that CBC’s use of baseball players’ identities in its fantasy baseball products 
satisfied the commercial advantage requirement, despite the identities not being used as an 
advertisement or endorsement.
86
  
3. Lack of Consent 
As first noted in Haelan, the right of publicity includes the right for a person to license 
his or her identity.
87
  Use of one’s identity without valid consent through such a license 
constitutes a violation of the right of publicity.
88
  Valid consent can be demonstrated through an 
express or implied license or assignment.
89
  Conversely, a lack of consent can be inferred if a 
defendant cannot demonstrate an express or implied license or assignment existed, or if the 
defendant’s use is inconsistent with the terms of a license or assignment.90  
4. Resulting injury  
The final prong of a right of publicity claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an actual 
economic harm.
91
  This can be measured by calculating the value lost by the person whose 
identity was misappropriated, or by calculating the economic value derived from the use of the 
identity.
92
  Accordingly, if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his or her identity has commercial 
value, no right of publicity violation exists because the plaintiff did not suffer any injury.
93
 
IV. Application of the Right of Publicity to Student Athletes 
Applying the four-pronged analysis to student athletes, it is clear that EA’s use of student 
athlete images in NCAA Football violated the student athletes’ right of publicity.  
A. EA Used Student Athletes’ Identities in Its NCAA Football Game Series 
As discussed above, “identity” in publicity rights cases has been held to include use by 
another of virtual avatars that resemble a real person, as well as use by another of a person’s 
name.
94
  EA used both in their NCAA Football game series.
95
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Regarding the virtual avatar, it is important to note that since many college football 
games are televised, the physical characteristics of players and their uniforms have become 
associated with the student athletes on a national level.
96
  The virtual players in NCAA Football 
are nearly identical to their real-life student athlete counterparts, mirroring their jersey number, 
height, weight, skin color, hair color, playing style, handedness, performance statistics and 
hometown.
97
  In addition, the virtual players in the NCAA Football are depicted wearing the 
same accessories, such as visors, gloves and armbands that the student athletes favored while 
playing.
98
  These facts alone sufficiently demonstrate that EA used student athletes’ identities.  
In addition to mirroring the real-life players’ physical characteristics, EA also permits, 
and arguably encourages, its customers to add the student athlete names to NCAA Football
99
.  
Although the student athletes’ names do not appear in NCAA Football initially, EA programmed 
its games to allow consumers to add or edit the names of the virtual players, and save the 
modifications within the game.
100
  Furthermore, EA helped to facilitate the name-changing 
process in later editions.  Starting with NCAA Football 09, NCAA Football included a feature 
called “Locker Room,” which allows consumers to easily upload current NCAA player rosters 
into the game.
101
  Upon uploading the rosters, the names of the actual student athletes appear on 
the jerseys of their virtual counterparts.
102
   
In the event that a consumer remained unable to identify the virtual athlete with his real-
life counterpart after the roster upload, EA programmed its virtual game announcers to identify 
the virtual players by their names in game commentary.
103
  Prior to uploading player rosters or 
manually entering player names, commentators refer to the virtual players by jersey number 
only.
104
  After uploading a roster or manually entering a student athlete’s name, the game 
commentators will refer to the virtual player by their name; however, the game commentators 
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only recognize and announce the names which are programmed by EA into the game.
105
  For 
example, when the name Ryan Perriloux was entered into the game, the virtual commentators 
pronounced it correctly (as Perrillew); however, when “Perrillew” was entered into the game 
manually, the commentator did not recognize or say the name.
106
  In addition, Brad Nessler, an 
NCAA Football game commentator, admitted that these names are pre-recorded into the 
games.
107
   
 The game features described above demonstrate that EA used student athletes’ images in 
the NCAA Football games, and meet the first prong of the right of publicity analysis. 
B. EA Used Student Athletes’ Identities for a Commercial Advantage 
EA used the identities of student athletes for commercial gain.  Inserting the student 
athletes’ identities into its commercial product gave EA’s games a degree of realism, which is 
the primary reason for the popularity and success of the EA Games.
108
  Additionally, one student 
athlete claimed other “commerical use violations,” alleging that EA used his identity to 
advertise, market and endorse NCAA Football.
109
  These additional claims are not required to 
find that EA used the identities for a commercial gain.
110
  Perhaps most importantly, EA admits 
that the revenue generated from its games is greatly enhanced by the use of intellectual property 
licensed from third parties, such as the NCAA.
111
   
C. EA Used Student Athletes’ Identities Without Consent 
Use of another’s identity without permission of the person or entity that holds the rights 
to the image constitutes lack of consent.
112
  The student athletes did not license images to EA; in 
fact, they are prohibited from doing so under the NCAA bylaws.
113
  The Form 11-3a, which 
student athletes are required to sign, provides the NCAA the right to use student athletes’ 
likenesses to promote NCAA championships, events, activities or programs.
114
  Though this 
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includes a provision which allows NCAA to sublicense student athletes’ identities to third 
parties,
115
 it cannot be said that EA’s NCAA Football games are NCAA championships, events, 
activities or programs.  
D. EA’s Unauthorized Use of  Student Athletes’ Identities Injures Them 
Courts look to the pecuniary loss of the plaintiff or the pecuniary gain of the defendant 
resulting from the use to determine damages under right of publicity claims.
116
  In either case, for 
a plaintiff to prove damages, the plaintiff needs to show that his or her identity has economic 
value.
117
 
The pecuniary loss to student athletes is difficult to ascertain because the amateurism 
provision of the NCAA bylaws prevents student athletes from licensing their image in exchange 
for compensation.
118
  This does not mean that the identities of student athletes do not have 
commercial value, however.  The NCAA bylaws regarding amateurism are nothing more than 
guiding principles of an organization and do not trump state’s right of publicity laws.119  
Ultimately, because student athletes are not compensated and the NCAA license to EA (even if 
its terms were disclosed) does not include the transfer of student athlete identities, it is not 
possible to determine definitively the pecuniary loss to the student athletes. 
Conversely, it is not possible to determine, in absolute terms, the pecuniary gain to EA 
resulting from the use of student athlete identities, but EA uses similar licensing structures in 
other games.  Those licensing agreements, therefore, may estimate the value of the student 
athletes’ identities.  For example, EA pays $35 million per year to license NFL players’ identities 
for its Madden NFL games.
120
  Although this is not a perfect comparison, it provides a court a 
relevant factor to consider in formulating damages.  Moreover, a court could compare the 
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profitability of EA’s NCAA football games before and after the virtual players became easily 
identifiable with their real-life counterparts.   
Because EA receives a pecuniary benefit from unauthorized use of student athletes’ 
identities, the student athletes can prove they have been injured by this use.  
V. Crossroads―the First Amendment, Hart and the Right of Publicity 
A. The First Amendment 
In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States found that a California statute that 
prohibited the sale of violent video games to children was unconstitutional, and, in doing so, held 
that video games are entitled to First Amendment protection.
121
  The court found that video 
games communicate ideas and social messages, like books, plays and movies that all receive 
protection under the First Amendment, and, much like those traditionally protected media, use 
literary devices to communicate those messages.
122
  When video games feature likenesses of real 
people, First Amendment interests are placed at odds with publicity rights of the individual. 
In cases where First Amendment rights clash with the right of publicity, courts must 
weigh the effects of enforcing one right over the other.
123
  To do so, courts must balance the 
importance of the right to free expression and the consequences of limiting that right against the 
consequences associated with infringing on the right of publicity. 
124
  Courts have invoked a 
variety of methods to assist in the balancing of First Amendment and publicity rights.  The 
methods used by the court in Hart included discussing commercial speech (which receives less 
First Amendment protection), public interest, and transformative use.  Each will be addressed in 
turn in the following section.  
B. Hart v. Electronic Arts: The Background 
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Ryan Hart filed a putative class action suit against Electronic Arts on June 15, 2009, in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County,
125
 which was later removed 
to the United States District Court, District of New Jersey on November 24, 2009.
126
  On 
September 22, 2010, Hart’s first amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice on all counts, 
save the right of publicity claim, which was dismissed without prejudice.
127
  Hart filed a new 
complaint on October 12, 2010, asserting a more detailed claim for breach of his right of 
publicity.
128
  In this complaint, Hart asserted that the EA violated his right of publicity based on 
its use of his likeness in NCAA Football.
129
  The complaint alleged that a virtual player in NCAA 
Football shared identical attributes to Hart
130
, as listed in the Rutgers University Football Media 
Guide.
131
  The Media Guide stated that Hart came from Florida, was six feet, two inches tall, 
weighed one hundred ninety-seven pounds, wore jersey number 13, wore a left wrist band, and 
wore a helmet visor.
132
  Hart was the only quarterback at Rutgers University who hailed from 
Florida.
133
  A virtual Rutgers quarterback was identical to Hart.  The game stated that the virtual 
quarterback came from Florida, was six feet, two inches tall, weighed one hundred ninety-seven 
pounds, and wore jersey number 13, a left wrist band and a helmet visor.
134
  Hart further alleged 
that the 2006 edition of NCAA Football mirrored his actual playing statistics during the football 
season.
135
   
The court granted summary judgment in favor of Electronic Arts, holding that the 
defendant’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression outweighed the plaintiff’s right of 
publicity.
136
  Subsequently, on February 10, 2012, Hart appealed the ruling to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.137  
C. Hart v. Electronic Arts: Analysis of Claims under the First Amendment 
1. Commercial Speech Analysis 
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Before discussing EA’s First Amendment defense, the court held that NCAA Football 
was not commercial speech subject to less First Amendment protection.
138
  To reach this holding, 
the court relied on Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc.,
139
 which provides three factors to consider in 
determining whether speech is commercial or noncommercial: 1.) whether the speech is an 
advertisement; 2.) whether the speech refers to a specific product or service; and 3.) whether the 
speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.
140
  Facenda instructs that “an affirmative 
answer to all three questions provides ‘strong support’ for the conclusion that speech is 
commercial.”141  The court applied the Facenda factors in analyzing Hart’s claim, and 
determined that use of student athletes’ identities in the game could not be considered an 
advertisement, because the student athlete identities were part of the game and could not be seen 
until after the commercial transaction took place.
142
     
2. Transformative Use Analysis 
After determining that EA video games should not be considered commercial speech, the 
court next considered whether the First Amendment granted EA the right to encroach on Hart’s 
right of publicity.
143
  
The Court evaluated Hart’s claims under two tests: the transformative use and the Rogers 
test.
144
  The Court’s analysis resulted in favoring EA under both tests.145 As the Court also 
concluded that the “transformative test best encapsulates the type of nuanced analysis required to 
properly balance the competing right of publicity and First Amendment interests,”146 this paper 
will focus on the court’s application of the transformative use test.  
a. Transformative Use Test 
The transformative use test has its roots in copyright law.
147
  Copyright law grants a 
limited monopoly to creators of a work fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
148
  However, 
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this monopoly is tempered by the fair use doctrine, which allows others to use copyrighted work 
for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”149  The statute 
provides factors to determine whether the use of a copyrighted work constitutes fair use, 
including how much of the copyrighted work is used, whether the new work was created for a 
commercial purpose, and whether the new work impacts the market for the copyrighted work.
150
   
Proving a work is a fair use of a copyrighted work is a complete defense to copyright 
infringement.
151
  Courts have embraced the transformative use test to determine if use of a 
copyrighted work is a fair use.
152
 In cases involving copyright infringement claims, the 
transformative use test inquires whether a new work has relied on the original work, or if the new 
work transforms the original work by adding new expression, meaning or message.
153
 
b. Transformative Use Test Applied to Video Game Cases 
Recently, courts have been using the transformative use test to “reconcile tensions 
between publicity rights and constitutionally protected free expression,”154 including in the Hart 
case.  In determining that EA’s use of student athlete images in NCAA Football was 
transformative, the court relied primarily on interpretation of, and comparisons to, two other 
cases: Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,
155
 and No Doubt v. Activision, Inc.
156
 These cases are 
particularly applicable to Hart, as they are also right of publicity cases involving video game 
avatars in which the transformative use test was applied.   
In Kirby, singer Kierin Kirby sued Sega, alleging a character in Sega’s video game Space 
Channel 5 was based on Kirby’s identity.  Kirby claimed Ulala’s name was based on Kirby’s 
catch phrase, ooh-la-la, and that Ulala’s clothing, facial features and hair color were all based on 
Kirby.
157
 Sega claimed Ulala was not based on Kirby, and that their game was therefore 
protected under the First Amendment.
158
  The California court of appeals applied the 
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transformative use test and determined that, although Ulala shared some similarities with Kirby, 
Sega introduced enough of its own creative elements to satisfy the transformative use test and 
receive protection under the First Amendment
159.  Those creative elements included Ulala’s 
clothing, which was merely similar to one of Kirby’s many costumes; Ulala’s hairstyle and 
dance moves, both of which were dissimilar to Kirby’s; and the game itself, set in outer space 
centuries into the future, which shared no similarity with Kirby’s style, video or photographs.160 
In No Doubt, the band No Doubt sued Activision based on their right of publicity.
161
  No 
Doubt entered into a license agreement with Activision, in which No Doubt provided Activision 
permission to use their likenesses to create avatars in the video game Band Hero.
162
 No Doubt 
then sued, claiming that, though Activision had permission to use their images under the license 
agreement, Activision’s use of the No Doubt avatars was outside the scope of the licensing 
agreement and therefore violated their right of publicity.
163
  Activision claimed its game was 
protected expressive work under the First Amendment.
164
 
Ruling in favor of No Doubt, the court determined that the video game was not 
transformative.
165
  The court explained that the video game was not transformative because the 
avatars were “painstakingly designed to mimic” the likenesses of the band members so that they 
could “be” the rock stars,166 the avatars perform rock songs on stage, the activity by which No 
Doubt is famous for,
167
 and the game doesn’t allow the player to change the appearance of the 
avatars.
168
 
c. Transformative Use Test Applied to Hart 
The Hart court determined that EA included sufficient elements of its own expression in 
NCAA Football to satisfy the requirements of the transformative use test.
169
  The court in Hart, 
however, misapplied the transformative use test, and therefore reached a faulty conclusion.  
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Contrary to the opinion in Hart, NCAA Football’s use of the student athletes’ identities was not 
transformative, and therefore was not entitled to First Amendment protection.   
As in Kirby, the court looked beyond the virtual player to other elements of the game, and 
found that there were “sufficient elements of EA’s own expression found in the game [to] justify 
the conclusion that its use of Hart’s image is transformative,”170 including coaches, stadiums, 
athletes, fans, commentary and more.
171
 In Kirby, the court analyzed the setting of Space 
Channel 5 not only to determine if it contained expressive elements, but to determine if those 
expressive elements were a part of, or shared any similarity with, Kirby’s identity.172  In NCAA 
Football, the expressive elements the court listed as comprising the setting of the game―college 
stadiums, coaches, fans―173 certainly are part of the identity of the student athletes.  The student 
athletes are known as college football players who compete at college stadiums with their 
coaches and in front of fans.  These elements are part of their identity.  Accordingly, the Hart 
court incorrectly determined that NCAA Football contained expressive elements beyond the 
virtual players.
174
 
The court’s reasoning in No Doubt further undercuts this portion of the Hart holding.  
The court cited three points in determining that the use of the No Doubt avatars in Band Hero 
was not transformative―the avatars were the literal likenesses of the band members, the avatars 
performed the activity from which the band members achieved their fame, and the consumers 
were unable to change the avatars’ appearance.175  In NCAA Football (and unchallenged by EA 
in Hart),
176
 the virtual players are the literal likenesses of the student athletes.
177
  Beyond using 
the literal images of student athletes to create the virtual players, EA also includes biographical 
information, physical attributes and abilities of the student athletes.
178
  The virtual players also 
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perform the activity from which the student athletes achieved their fame―playing college 
football in a college stadium with their coaches and in front of fans.
179
 
The court also found that Hart’s virtual image independently met transformative use.180  
The court conceded that the virtual player looked like Hart and was designed with the same 
physical attributes, physical abilities and biographical information as Hart,
181
 similar to the 
avatars in No Doubt.
182
  The court then distinguished Hart from No Doubt, finding that, unlike 
Band Hero, NCAA Football provides the ability to alter the virtual players’ images, physical 
abilities and teammates.
183
  Relying on Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the court 
found that Hart’s claim “fail[ed] to fully take into account the distinctive interactive nature of 
video games.”184  “‘[L]ike protected books, video games communicate ideas . . . through many 
familiar literary devices . . . and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s 
interaction with the virtual world).’  That suffices to confer EA protection . . . to deny First 
Amendment protection because the game initially displays the virtual player in an unaltered form 
would not give due accord to this expressive aspect of video games.”185  The court’s reliance on 
this quote to support its point is simply misplaced.  Although First Amendment protection, as 
stated in Brown, does apply to video games, it does not do so blindly and at the expense of 
publicity rights.  Rather, those First Amendment protections must still be balanced with 
copyright law and the right of publicity.  Courts have determined that the transformative use test 
is appropriate to evaluate both copyright infringement and right of publicity violation suits.
186
 
The analysis provided in this paper has shown that NCAA Football, though generally protected 
under the First Amendment, fails this test and therefore loses its First Amendment protection.  
If the Hart analysis were accepted and applied to future cases, it would essentially begin 
to erode of the right of publicity, at least within the world of video games.  Using the court’s 
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analysis, a commercial entity may use someone’s image without their permission and without 
compensating them, as long as the new work transforms the image by adding sufficient creative 
elements outside of the representation of the individual.  The problem with this analysis is that it 
provides an overly broad view on what satisfies transformation.  Under the Hart standard, video 
games such as EA’s Madden Football, which utilize the identity of real NFL players, would not 
violate the identity of those players even if the game were set in a football stadium and depicted 
virtual players playing football, as the real players do, so long as the game contains creative 
elements such as the ability to modify a jersey color, or add a mustache to a player. Video games 
like Band Hero would receive the same protection if consumers were able to modify the image 
of the avatars.   
This application of the transformative use test is dangerous, as it strips away a person’s 
right of publicity in an entire form of media. Publicity rights, like copyright, patent, and 
trademark rights, are an important form of intellectual property.  To cultivate a publicity right 
that has commercial value can take considerable money, time and energy.
187
  By allowing video 
game manufacturers to use another’s identity without compensation is to condone stealing 
property from that individual, and providing consumers the ability to modify the identity in a 
game does not change that- the stolen identity is still being used without compensation by the 
video game manufacturer. 
VI. Conclusion 
EA violated the publicity rights of student athletes in NCAA Football when it used the 
student athlete’s identities for their commercial advantage, without consent of, and resulting in 
injury to, the student athletes.  
22 
 
Video games are protected as creative works under the First Amendment, and this 
protection can outweigh an individual’s right to publicity.  First Amendment rights must be 
balanced against the individual’s right to publicity to ensure neither right impermissibly 
encroaches on the other.  The transformative use test has been utilized in cases implicating both 
right of publicity and First Amendment considerations. This test was applied in Hart, however, 
the court’s interpretation of the test resulted in EA’s First Amendment rights swallowing the 
publicity rights of the student athletes.  The approach used in Hart was incorrect, and its 
application to other similar cases will effectively erode the right of publicity as we know it, and 
as Prosser elucidated it in Privacy.  This problem was recognized by Hart’s attorney, Timothy J. 
McIlwain, who remarked “this is arguably the most important case in America today because it 
involves a citizen’s right to their persona and their image. There is nothing more sacred than 
your own identity. Whether you’re an artist, an athlete or a celebrity, a corporation’s right as an 
‘individual’ should not trump the rights of the real individual…there is just no way the framers 
of the US constitution intended that.”188 
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